Motorists can face an
allegation of speeding in three different ways by virtue of the
Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984. Firstly, temporary speed
restrictions can be imposed with regard to road works and
contravention of the temporary speed restriction is an
offence. Secondly, contravention of a speed limit relating to
a motorway is an offence. Thirdly, apart from motorway speed
limit and temporary speed restriction contraventions any
motorist who contravenes a speed limit commits an offence.
Recent case law has clarified that the prosecuting agency in the
case of a temporary speed restriction can elect as to whether to
prosecute for breaching that restriction or a speed limit.
Normally a motorist prosecuted for a
speeding offence cannot be convicted solely on the opinion evidence
of one witness to the effect that the motorist was driving a
vehicle at excess speed. However any motorist prosecuted for a
motorway speeding offence or for contravening a temporary speed
restriction at road works can be convicted on the unsupported
opinion evidence of a police officer provided, of course, that the
court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the officer's
opinion of excess speed is correct. Recent case law has
confirmed that where the prosecuting agency can elect to prosecute
for contravention of a temporary speed restriction at road works,
it would be tidier and more sensible to deal with the issue as
contravening a speed limit as there would be protection of the
motorist by virtue of the need for the officer's opinion evidence
to be supported by other evidence.
The requirements to provide additional
evidence supporting opinion evidence have proved to be a fertile
source of litigation. The opinion evidence of two police
officers speaking as to the speed of a vehicle at the same moment
in time can support each other's opinion evidence. However,
supporting evidence is usually provided nowadays by technology such
as the speedometer of a police vehicle, radar equipment, VASCAR or
by a laser speed measuring device. Case law established many
years ago that a motorist could be convicted on the opinion
evidence of one police officer supported by the reading of a
speedometer or other mechanical means, even though there was no
evidence that the speedometer had been tested or
calibrated. Similarly, case law has long since established
that a reading from a radar gun can amount to reliable or proper
support of the opinion evidence of a police officer even though the
gun has not been checked against the known speed of a vehicle
fitted with a calibrated speedometer. The Administrative Court
in three recent cases has given consideration to the evidence
requirements in the context of speed testing devices.
In R (on the Application of Bray) v
Bristol Crown Court [2009] it was held that the fact that a
laser speed detection device had not been calibrated in accordance
with the manufacturer’s instructions does not mean that the device
is no longer of an approved type. Accordingly, it was held
that the speed reading produced by such a device was capable of
constituting support of the officer's prior opinion as to
speed. The Administrative Court also emphasised that the
evidence from the device as to speed is only secondary evidence and
it is the opinion of the operator of the device regarding the speed
that is the primary evidence.
In Iaciofano v DPP [2010] the
Administrative Court held that a Police Pilot Provida in-car speed
detection device is not an approved device. The court further ruled
that it had not been open to the court below to find that it was
approved based on evidence that it had been installed in several
police cars. The Administrative Court quashed the motorist's
conviction for speeding but did remit the matter back to the court
below for reconsideration.
Statute regulates the admissibility of certain
evidence with regard to speeding offences. A record produced or
measurement made by a prescribed device shall not be admissible as
evidence in proceedings for a speeding offence unless the device is
of a type approved by the Secretary of State and any conditions
subject to which the approval was given are satisfied. A
"prescribed device" means a device of a description specified in an
order made by the Secretary of State.
In Connell v DPP [2011] the
Administrative Court ruled that a police officer was entitled to
support his opinion on excess speed by reference to the reading
given by the Police Pilot device despite the fact that it was an
unapproved prescribed device. In that case a police officer
had observed C driving a motor vehicle on a road where the speed
limit was 70 mph. In the officer's opinion C's vehicle was
travelling in excess of 90 mph. The officer followed C in his
police vehicle for some time before stopping him. At the trial
the police officer gave oral evidence of his assessment of C's
speed and supported that evidence by reference to the Police Pilot
speed measuring device that had been fitted to the police
vehicle. That device indicated that C had been driving at a
speed in excess of 90 mph. The Magistrates' Court held that
the type approval requirements were not relevant to the issue and
accordingly the evidence of the police officer was
admissible. The Administrative Court upheld the Magistrates'
Court ruling.
The Administrative Court observed that the
Administrative Court in Iaciofano would not, after
quashing the conviction for speeding, have remitted the matter for
reconsideration unless it thought that a conviction was possible on
the basis of a police officer's evidence of speed being supported
by an unapproved prescribed device. The Administrative Court noted
that the police officer in the case had given unchallenged evidence
as to C's speed; that support for this could be found in the fact
that the police officer had been travelling in excess of 90 mph and
would from time to time have looked at his speedometer and that
when stopped C had not challenged the police officer's opinion as
to speed.
The Connell case is an illustration
of the Administrative Court's recent approach to the requirements
of evidence supporting opinion evidence. These requirements would
not appear to be as prescriptive as some defence lawyers would seek
to argue. All the court at trial needs to be concerned with is
whether or not it is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the
opinion evidence of the police officer as to speed and that this
evidence is supported by other evidence that the court considers to
be reliable so that it can be sure that the motorist was, indeed,
speeding.
View further information on speeding
offences.
